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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) has emerged as the main1
enabler to deal with challenging use cases that require massive2
Machine-Type Communications (mMTC), and mMTC has been3
recognized as one of three use case types for the Fifth Generation4
(5G) and beyond networks. In IoT networks, it is prohibitive5
to rely on just one firewall where hundreds of thousands of6
rules need to be installed in order to provide security counter-7
measures to each of the IoT devices. To fill this gap, this8
paper proposes an automatic deployment of virtual firewalls9
by leveraging Network Function Virtualisation (NFV) Manage-10
ment and Orchestration (MANO) to protect NB-IoT mMTC11
communications. The main idea underneath is to use NFV to12
deal with efficient rule distribution across VNFs-based firewalls13
to achieve scalability in the number of managed IoT devices.14
Empirical results have validated the design and implementation15
of the proposed scheme and demonstrating its advantageous16
performance and scalability. In particular, the deployment time17
for this VNF-based firewall service is highlighted to meet the18
requirement of a 5G Key Performance Indicator (KPI).19
Keywords–5G; NB-IoT; Security; Firewall; Automatic Deploy-20
ment; VNF; MANO; NFV.21
I. INTRODUCTION22
The European 5G Public Private Partnership (5G PPP)23
[1] has defined ambitious Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)24
to be fulfilled in 5G networks. One of these KPIs is to25
achieve 1 million devices per square kilometer [2]. This26
KPI is associated to massive Machine-Type Communications27
(mMTC), one of the three use cases defined by ITU 128
regarding the novel capabilities that 5G networks should29
support. This high-density scenario is traditionally associated30
to cheap insecure IoT sensors and actuators, which cannot31
enforce proper security mechanisms. To enable secure mMTC32
in 5G networks, the network infrastructure needs to be ready33
to deal with diverse kinds of cyber-attacks.34
To dynamically mitigate those cyber-attacks in a 5G-35
enabled IoT network, both the Edge and the Core of the36
5G network need to filter, mirror, divert and differentiate37
IoT packets. Nonetheless, dealing with those attacks requires38
deploying a large number of firewall rules on each of these39
radio access points in order to deal with the control and40
security of the devices. Using hardware-based approaches for41
this large number of rules will impose a significant increase42
in the costs of the network elements mainly due to the43
memory requirements associated. In contrast, using software-44
based and Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) approaches will45
reduce costs but would impose challenges to deal with the46
scalability of the rules.47
1https://www.itu.int/md/R15-SG05-C-0040/en
Our previous paper [3] has performed an empirical eval- 48
uation to determine how many firewall rules can be deployed 49
inside a VNF virtual firewall to deal with NB-IoT traffic 50
crossing the 5G network without decreasing the Quality of 51
Service (QoS) of the transmission. The increasing number of 52
filtering rules attached in each VNF firewall downgrades its 53
performance since more computational processing is needed 54
to check all the rules for the traffic in this software-based 55
solution. Therefore, a balance in terms of capacity and 56
performance has been determined. 57
This paper further explores a distributed VNF firewall 58
architecture, where the system can either insert a new firewall 59
rule inside an existing VNF firewall or deploy a new VNF 60
firewall to provide more computational resources to handle 61
scalability. To allow a cognitive network management system 62
to make efficient decisions on actions, a deep understanding 63
of the problem is needed. Whilst the previous paper focused 64
on firewall rule configuration times and optimal number 65
for maximum rules per VNF, this paper investigates VNF 66
deployment times to perform the automatic deployment of a 67
new VNF Firewall and configuration times of the VNF. The 68
main aim is to provide an architecture that is able to deal 69
with the high-density number of devices imposed in mMTC 70
scenarios by making an efficient distribution of firewall rules 71
among different VNFs. The design has been empirically 72
validated in a realistic 5G multi-tenant infrastructure. 73
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews 74
existing service deployment orchestration techniques and 75
IoT security systems. Section III outlines the management 76
framework. Section IV describes the virtualized 5G infras- 77
tructure deployed for a realistic NB-IoT testbed. Deployment 78
of new VNFs with the proposed virtual IoT firewall as a 79
service is presented in Section V. Section VI reports the 80
experimental results in terms of efficiency, suitability and 81
scalability. Finally, conclusions and future work are included 82
in Section VII. 83
II. RELATED WORK 84
5G-PPP has highlighted autonomous and cognitive net- 85
work management as a key enabler in 5G networks for 86
handling complex networking scenarios, especially when 87
manual management is prohibitive such as in mMTC [4]. 88
A. 5G Service Deployment Orchestration 89
Autonomous and cognitive network management requires 90
automated orchestration in interacting with different Appli- 91
cation Programming Interfaces (APIs) that control, manage 92
and configure resources and services. Following the Mobile 93
Edge Computing (MEC) [5] architecture, an orchestrator94
to control a large number of distributed machines requires95
capabilities in operating system provisioning, NFV provi-96
sioning, resource life-cycle control, NFV life-cycle control,97
multi-tenancy support, multi-zone support, service location98
awareness, workflow dependencies resolution and parallel99
deployment optimization, among other features.100
OpenMano [6] delivers an open source management and101
orchestration (MANO) stack aligned with ETSI NFV Infor-102
mation Models. It covers resource and service life-cycle man-103
agement. OpenBaton [7] is an extensible and customizable104
framework capable of orchestrating network services across105
heterogeneous NFV Infrastructures. It uses OpenStack to106
control the underline infrastructure. OpenMANO and Open-107
Baton cover mainly NFV life-cycle management, resource108
management, multi-tenancy support, and multi-zone support.109
Chirivella et al. [8] provides an inclusive solution for the110
complete life cycle of 5G service deployment over multi-111
tenant 5G MEC infrastructures, based on Juju, MaaS and112
OpenStack. Our research work presented in this paper is113
based on this orchestration software, which has been extended114
to perform the automatic deployment of the architecture115
proposed. The virtual firewall is wrapped to be manageable116
by the orchestrator to allow the automatic deployment of VNF117
firewalls.118
B. Existing NB-IoT Attack Mitigation Systems119
Parakovic et al. [9] describe how the volume of attacks120
has increased by 651% in the last two years, mainly due to121
the increasing number of IoT devices connected. The Mirai122
attack in 2016 has motivated the community to better research123
how to defence against DDoS attacks (e.g., [10]) and new124
autonomic schemes for thread mitigation are consequently125
being defined (e.g., [11]). Despite the considerable number126
of related studies in the area of IoT security, there is still127
no solution to protect NB-IoT devices connected to the128
5G infrastructure, where the new infrastructure entails novel129
mechanisms able to deal with nested traffic encapsulation pro-130
duced, e.g., by multi-tenancy and mobility support. In [12],131
Hsieh et al. propose Virtual MEC (vMEC) to increase IoT132
applications’ Quality of Service (QoS). Miettinen et al. [13]133
present Sentinel, a system capable of automatically identify-134
ing types of devices being connected to an IoT network and135
enabling enforcement of rules for constraining the vulnerable136
communications. Meng [14] proposes an Intrusion Detection137
System (IDS) that can be automatically deployed in the server138
to perform trust computation based on traffic features. In139
[15] a multi-level DDoS mitigation framework (MLDMF) for140
Industrial IoT (IIoT) is proposed, which includes the cloud141
computing, fog computing, edge computing and Software142
Defined Networking (SDN) for improving access security and143
efficient management of IIoT. Saraim et al. [16] introduce144
NETRA, a Docker-based architecture for virtualizing network145
functions to provide IoT security by deploying security146
functions at the network edge.147
Moreover, a comparative study of different IoT mali-148
cious traffic mitigation systems has been conducted in [3].149
The conclusion is that existing work is based merely on150
either detection or mitigation of such traffic. Little work151
has considered a complete detection and mitigation control152
loop for 5G IoT networks. Furthermore, as far as we know,153
there is barely any existing deployment and configuration 154
strategies integrated as part of the actuation in a cognitive 155
5G IoT management framework. These gaps have motivated 156
this research work. 157
III. OVERVIEW OF 5G IOT MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 158
NB-IoT deployment in 5G networks imposes challenging 159
management requirements, such as multi-tenancy (differenti- 160
ation of traffic from different network operators, carriers or 161
verticals sharing the same physical infrastructure), scalability 162
(support of a massive number of IoT devices), and dynamic 163
network management of the traffic according to security poli- 164
cies and the current context obtained from real-time monitor- 165
ing. These requirements demand novel security management 166
frameworks that can rely on software defined network (SDN) 167
management and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) 168
technologies for handling the dynamic and scalability, thereby 169
deploying or decommissioning, on-demand, virtual network 170
security functions such as virtual firewalls (vFirewalls). 171
Figure 1 shows the general architecture of the security 172
management framework employed in this paper and was 173
presented in our previous work [3]. The architecture is 174
split into three main planes. The Admin Plane includes the 175
GUI and tools for security management, including security 176
policy tools. The Security Orchestration Plane endows the 177
framework with the proper cyber-situational awareness, intel- 178
ligence and orchestration tools to make security and network 179
decisions dynamically according to the circumstances. To 180
this aim, it interacts with the Monitoring module to gather 181
network and system information from physical and virtual 182
agents deployed either in the edge or in the core of the 183
network. Moreover, in this plane, the Reaction/Cognitive 184
module embraces a decision support system that provides the 185
required intelligence to generate the proper reaction plan and 186
countermeasures that need to be deployed in the system to 187
address misbehaviour in the system, e.g., in an event of an 188
attack. The Security Orchestrator manages the security plan 189
and orchestrates the enforcement of the security countermea- 190
sures in the systems. For this purpose, it instructs the Security 191
Enforcement Plane, which is in turn, is composed of the 192
IoT Controller, SDN Controller and NFV MANO to deploy 193
and (re)configure the VNFs. NFV-MANO is responsible for 194
secure placement and management of VNFs and Security 195
VNFs over the virtualized infrastructure managed by the 196
Virtual Infrastructure Manager (VIM) component. Thus, it is 197
in charge of realizing the scalable and dynamic deployment 198
of vFirewalls required in our solution. The vFirewall can be 199
deployed at the edge close to the Radio Access Network 200
(RAN) or in the core of the 5G network. In addition, the SDN 201
Controller upon an orchestration command coming from the 202
North-bound API can add or update filtering rules in the 203
vFirewall. 204
IV. VIRTUALIZED 5G INFRASTRUCTURE 205
Figure 2 shows an overview of the experimental in- 206
frastructure deployed for conducting the validation of the 207
proposed framework. A virtualized LTE-based architecture, 208
which also includes several 5G features, is presented and 209
explained in this section. 10 Computers with Ubuntu 16.04 210
operating system and OpenStack Mitaka compose this infras- 211
tructure. The deployment utilizes Neutron and OpenDayLight 212
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Figure 1. Management architecture for the proposed system
as the SDN Controller. OpenDayLight uses OpenFlow and213
OVSDB for controlling the Open Virtual Switch (OVS)214
software, which, in turn, controls the data path of virtual215
machines. As can be seen from the figure, different colours216
(blue and purple) represent different tenant/administrative217
domains, and each one has used a completely different set218
of VNFs along the 5G network. By using the last release219
of the Mosaic5G 2 project, a decoupling between DU and220
CU on the RAN side has been achieved. Although the221
components in the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) still use222
the MME, HSS and SGW/PGW terminology, they are fully223
virtualized and running in VNFs in line with the 5G vision.224
Those VNFs provided by Mosaic5G, which is an evolution of225
OpenAirInterface 3, have been deployed by using a VIM such226
as OpenStack 4. OpenStack controls those virtual resources227
and allows the sharing of physical resources by more than one228
tenant. In addition, a Service Infrastructure Manager (SIM)229
deploys services over virtual layers, controls the life-cycle of230
the services and allows functionalities such as redeployment,231
reconfiguration, upgrading, start and stop. The SIM employed232
in this research is the one referred to as VNFM in the233
ETSI MANO architecture, i.e., Juju [17]. Following the234
same approach, the VIM deploys new virtual machines when235
required and add them to the vFirewall stack of a specific236
tenant. Later on, by using the SIM, those virtual machines237
2http://mosaic-5g.io/
3http://www.openairinterface.org/
4https://www.openstack.org/
are configured as NB-IoT services. This workflow is further 238
explained in more detail in section V. 239
It has been previously demonstrated [3] that the proposed 240
NB-IoT vFirewall is not only able to deal with IoT protocols 241
but also 5G network traffic with nested encapsulation such 242
as Virtual eXtensible Local Area (VXLAN) and/or General 243
Packet Radio Service (GPRS) Tunneling Protocol (GTP) to 244
provide features such as mobility, tenant isolation, admission 245
control and so on. Since 5G packets travelling along this 246
infrastructure are encapsulated by different encapsulation 247
protocols depending on the network segment, this is a perfect 248
scenario to allow investigating and analyze NB-IoT traffic 249
throughout all different network segments. 250
V. SCALABLE DEPLOYMENT OF VFIREFALLS DESIGN 251
The designed approach is focused on automatical deploy- 252
ment of NB-IoT vFirewalls when required from the security 253
policies in the framework. Each VNF instantiated for this 254
purpose will have a different set of rules for multi-tenancy, 255
device mobility and NB-IoT compliance for handling traffic 256
crossing the infrastructure. Those rules represent specific 257
traffic that needs to be mitigated for security reasons. In 258
order to speed up the service configuration process, the split 259
of rules between different VNFs is carried out using, like 260
a splitting criterion, the source IP address where a mask 261
is applied to determine to which VNF should be installed. 262
There is an inventory with the number of VNFs currently 263
deployed and a modulus is applied over the result of the 264
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Figure 2. Network infrastructure with vFirewalls for the proposed system
marking in order to determine the associated VNF. Therefore,265
when the Orchestrator triggers the action of deploying a new266
vFirewall for a specific tenant, the vFirewall already knows267
how to perform the loading of rules as this is instructed by268
the configuration service parameters.269
The following describes the required steps for deploying270
a new VNF with a 5G vFirewall acting as a service. Figure271
3 defines a workflow diagram, which represents different272
phases since the Orchestrator sends the command to add a273
new virtual NB-IoT Firewall.274
In the first step, the Orchestrator sends a deployment275
request to the SIM for deploying a new VNF. That request276
message is triggered when the framework described in section277
III detects that there are not enough advisable resources278
on existing vFirewalls for applying a new set of rules or279
because those vFirewalls are handling a different NB-IoT280
device domain. Subsequently, the SIM (Juju) interacts with281
the VIM (OpenStack) to start the installation of the operating282
system. The VIM returns a success response to the SIM once283
that process is finished. Secondly, once the operating system284
has been installed, the SIM sends a request to the previously285
created VNF for installing the Element Managed System286
(EMS), which is able to control the life-cycle of each service287
deployed including actions such as start, stop, re-install,288
uninstall, redeploy, reconfigure and so on. When the EMS289
installation is completed, the same VNF notifies the SIM290
(Juju), which in turn does the same with the Orchestrator.291
Finally, the Orchestrator starts the installation procedure of292
the 5G vFirewall service by sending this request to the SIM.293
Consequently, the SIM performs the installation and initial294
configuration of the VNF service, and notifies the Orches-295
trator. After that, the Orchestrator will select the rule set296
given by the upper layers and will interact directly with the297
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Figure 3. Sequence diagram to deploy a new vFirewall
new VNF vFirwall in order to load the configuration therein. 298
Finally, the Orchestrator configures OpenStack (Neutron) in 299
order to redirect the traffic to the new VNF Firewall created. 300
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION301
A. Testbed description302
The following testbed has been created to empirically303
validate the proposed design and evaluate the service de-304
ployment times by measuring the performance of the instal-305
lation of vFirewalls as VNF services in the proposed 5G306
infrastructure. The testbed has been built by employing 6307
physical machines as managed computers, each one with308
8 cores, 24 Gbytes of RAM, and 4x1Gbps Ethernet NICs309
+ IPMI Ethernet. Each physical machine contains up to310
8 VMs. Therefore, the managed infrastructure consists of311
up to 48 machines. These machines are managed by a312
physical machine with an Intel Xeon Processor E5-2630313
v4 with 32GBytes and 3x10Gbit Ethernet NIC, acting as314
a management plane. Although it is known that nested315
virtualization has a negative impact on performance, this316
testbed has allowed us to demonstrate the scalability of the317
proposed system with a large number of managed resources.318
Therefore, better performance results can be expected at319
production grade deployments. It is worth mentioning that the320
infrastructure presented in Figure 2 matches the deployment321
carried out in our testbed.322
B. NB-IoT Virtual Firewall Capacity Test323
Figure 4 provides the configuration times of a VNF324
firewall from scratch when all filtering rules have to be loaded325
to the system at once to provide the initial configuration of the326
vFirewall. In order to figure out a trade-off in terms of scal-327
ability, a set of experiments were carried out by applying a328
different number of filtering rules in the initial configuration.329
As seen in the figure, a base two exponential stressing test330
has been conducted. The results show that 4096 filtering NB-331
IoT rules are the maximum that each vFirewall can load at its332
configuration time without surpassing 1 second. Beyond that333
point, the configuration time increases over limits that would334
not be efficient enough in terms of response time, delay and335
packet losses.336
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In addition to configuration times, Table I shows Packet337
Loss Ratio, Transmission Time Overhead and Jitter when338
4096 simultaneous NB-IoT devices are being inspected in339
real-time from one vFirewall. It should be noted that these340
experiments have been conducted by assuming a homoge- 341
neous set of IoT devices with specific features. However, 342
the proposed solution would also be able to deal with 343
heterogeneous IoT environments as long as those devices 344
comply with the specs herein defined. For a deeper analysis 345
of heterogeneity in terms of IoT devices, we refer to our 346
previous work in [3]. For a deeper analysis of heterogeneity 347
in terms of IoT devices, we refer to our previous work in 348
[3]. As can be seen in the third column, the performance of 349
all of the metrics are within reasonable ranges. There is no 350
packet loss or transmission time overhead and the Jitter is 351
acceptable for NB-IoT applications. Therefore, this test has 352
proved the feasibility of the proposed solution. 353
TABLE I. STATISTICS WHEN 4096 FLOWS ARE BEING SIMULTANEOUSLY
HANDLED
Measured Feature Units Value
Packet Loss Ratio Percentage 0.00%
Transmission Time Overhead Seconds 0
Average of Jitter Milliseconds 0.2414
Configuration Time Seconds 0.8
C. Scalability and Stress Results 354
This section validates the scalability results achieved 355
when different stress methods are applied to the proposed 356
system. Figure 5 provides the deployment times by increasing 357
the scale of the vFirewalls deployment scenario exponentially 358
from 2 VMs up to 48 VMs with each VM performing a 359
loading a 4096 rule set. It leads to a scenario supporting from 360
4096 NB-IoT to a maximum of 196,608 NB-IoT devices. 361
Moreover, it is noted that for each of these scenarios, different 362
ramping times have been executed. The ramping time is 363
defined as the time elapsed between two requests for the 364
instantiation of a new vFirewall each time. Therefore, the 365
lower the ramping time is, the higher the system is stressed 366
since it means that all the NB-IoT devices have been very 367
rapidly connected to the system and the time for requests 368
between different VNFs is very low. The results show four 369
different levels of stress: 0s, 1s, 5s and 10s, 0s being the most 370
stressed one, meaning that all the NB-IoT devices (196,608 371
devices for the largest scenario analyzed) are simultaneously 372
connected. 373
At a glance, Figure 5 shows linear trends in deployment 374
times regardless of the number of vFirewalls deployed and 375
also regardless of the level of stress of the system (ramping 376
time). These results clearly validate the scalability of the 377
proposed system. It is noted that in order to emulate this 378
large number of NB-IoT devices, we have gathered Packet 379
Captures (PCAPs) from the real infrastructure and replicated 380
them with different IP addresses to generate the traffic 381
associated to each of the NB-IoT devices and thus stress the 382
data path. 383
Figure 5 shows three different times stacked. The first 384
time is the time spent on the installation of the VM itself, 385
which is around 4s taking in all the cases. The second one 386
represents the time consumed in installing the EMS and the 387
vFirewall component in this VM, which is always around 3s. 388
Finally, the third time is the loading time of all the firewall 389
rules related to all the NB-IoT devices inside the vFirewall. 390
It can be concluded that the system scales with respect to the 391
number of VNFs and also with respect to the ramping time, 392
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which implies that it scales with a large number of NB-IoT393
devices.394
It is worth noting that there is a fourth measured time395
that is the time required to configure OpenStack in order to396
redirect the traffic to the newly create vFirewall in order to397
include it into the data path. However, this negligible time is398
not shown in the figure since it is less than 1ms and it cannot399
be seen in the graph with the scale in seconds.400
VII. CONCLUSION401
This paper has proposed a new virtual firewall based IoT402
security solution and its automatic deployment scheme for403
5G mMTC scenarios. The solution performs a smart trade-404
off between configuring rules in an existing VNF firewall405
and performing the deployment of a new VNF firewall,406
configuring the virtual firewall into the data plane and al-407
lowing splitting the large rule set between the existing ones.408
Experimental results have validated the maximum number of409
NB-IoT multi-tenant rules that can be managed by each of410
the virtual firewalls. Moreover, empirical deployment results411
have displayed a clear linear trend in the deployment times412
of new VNFs when the scenario scales up, thereby validating413
the proper scalability of the architecture. In addition, perfor-414
mance results have shown the feasibility to deal with close to415
200,000 NB-IoT devices, through the automatic deployment416
of 48 virtual firewalls in less than 6.4 minutes (i.e., only 8417
sec per firewall on average).418
In future work, we will investigate other kinds of vir-419
tual network security functions such as virtual Channel-420
Protection, to be deployed at the edge of the NB-IoT network,421
in order to protect and isolate further traffic among users,422
carriers and verticals in different network slices.423
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